Suely Araújo’s birthday was on the same Thursday in May that she spoke with Sur. Celebrations, however, were marred by bitter news from Brasília: the previous night, the Federal Senate had approved the General Licensing Law, deemed the biggest legislative setback in environmental matters in Brazilian history. The former president of the Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (Ibama) and current public policy coordinator at the Climate Observatory regarded the decision as more than merely a move to protect agribusiness interests which, as she explains in this interview, have always dominated the Legislative branch. The approval represented an undermining of the democratic process, which, according to her, has been accelerating with the rise of the far right in Brazil.
She speaks from experience: Araújo worked in the Congress’s Legislative Consultancy for three decades, drafting laws and actively participating in complex negotiations alongside parliamentarians from across the political spectrum. Later, at the invitation of former minister José Sarney Filho, she assumed the presidency of Ibama during Michel Temer’s administration. When Jair Bolsonaro was elected in 2018, she became one of the most vocal critics of the dismantling of environmental policies carried out by his government.
In the conversation that follows, Araújo shares her valuable personal perspective on the paths of environmental policy and their intersection with the defense of rights in a scenario rife with denialism. She also advocates for strengthening democratic, multilateral, and networked processes, without which, she believes, it will be difficult to protect people and the planet from forces that have pushed us to the brink of collapse. “Politics,” says Aráujo, “entails negotiating the content of decision-making processes and making concessions. And neither the environmental agenda nor the human rights agenda will ever have the upper hand.”
Sur Journal • In your opinion, what is the relationship between the idea of climate justice and the fight against inequality and the defense of human rights? At what point and how did the issue of climate come to occupy a central position on the rights agenda?
Suely Araújo • The climate crisis and effects are deeply unjust across different countries, but also within each country. Countries that have contributed very little to the climate crisis are directly suffering from its consequences, as is the case of the small islands, island states, and countries with densely populated coastlines. And considering how much these countries have generated emissions historically, it makes no sense.
The same happens within each country: everyone suffers the effects of climate change, even big business and the all-powerful agribusiness sector, but the most vulnerable populations in both urban and rural areas are unable to cope with these impacts. After a landslide, they cannot afford to build a new home. When the water supply in the area where they live dries up, they cannot fish or feed themselves–there is no solution available. People with means are able to adapt somehow. If it gets too hot they can buy an air conditioning unit. Poor communities cannot do this–they are completely dependent on the goodwill of their governments.
In the case of Brazil, when we talk about underprivileged communities, there are clear components of race and gender. Most of our low-income population is of Black origin and women are disproportionately the heads of households. This is why I always like to stress that, in Brazil, the climate crisis has a distinct racial and gender dimension. This is why public policy in general–and climate policy in particular–must clearly define these perspectives, if they are to be effective.
Sur • This edition of Sur analyses authoritarianism in the Global South and its relationship with the human rights agenda. In Brazil, you witnessed up close the systematic dismantling of environmental policy during Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency. Could you tell us how this unfolded and what the key moments of this process were?
SA • The government of Jair Bolsonaro and other similar ones are emerging and spreading around the world, which is why it is important to talk about this. I would like to give a very personal account: during the electoral campaign, when Bolsonaro announced his intention to run, I was serving as president of Ibama. We were under a very difficult administration–that of Michel Temer–and I was increasingly uneasy. We were working hard to curb deforestation in the Amazon.
During the electoral campaign, Bolsonaro, then a candidate, started to attack Ibama with such force that staff in the field faced retaliation in communities and villages. When I stated to the press that he was endorsing environmental crime, it sparked a row that lasted throughout his entire administration. I became something of a spokesperson for the socioenvironmental perspective, which encompassed concern over the rights of the Indigenous peoples, quilombola communities, all the communities that inhabit the forest, and the coastal (caiçara) populations..
And during Bolsonaro’s administration, I made a point of taking on a level of public exposure that is not typical of my personality. I had worked in the Chamber of Deputies for most of my professional life, drafting laws for members of Congress to sign. My main quality was precisely that I did not stand out. However, during Bolsonaro’s government, I took on the task of exposing what was happening inside the government.
I am proud of the fact that during my time at the head of Ibama, I was able to establish a strong connection with the staff. Through this connection I came to understand what was happening and began speaking out about the wrongdoings, dismantling, and the implosion of environmental and climate governance. The collegiate bodies were all either paralyzed or abolished. The possibility of participating and of representing the population in the decision-making spaces came to an end.
So, gradually, I took on this role–along with others–of exposing the dismantling of public policies and socioenvironmental rights. It was a tough experience and I felt very vulnerable to criticism, but I saw it as a kind of mission.
There are some problems in Lula’s third term, particularly in the energy sector, but there is no comparison. Bolsonaro’s administration was defined by denialism–not only of environmental policy and socioenvironmental rights but also of citizenship rights. It was very difficult to witness this happening in Brazil, the idea that we could return to such a situation is hard to contemplate.
Sur • Our conversation is taking place just one day after the Senate approved the General Environmental Licensing Law, also known as the “Devastation Bill.”11. “Senado aprova projeto da Lei Geral do Licenciamento Ambiental”, Agência Senado, May 21, 2025, accessed November 11, 2025, https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2025/05/21/senado-aprova-projeto-da-lei-do-licenciamento-ambiental. What is the political significance of this defeat for environmental safeguarding?
SA • The government lost and we are heading toward a major setback with the implosion of environmental licensing laws. We are probably facing the worst reversal since the National Environmental Policy Act of 1981, enacted at the end of the military regime. That policy was drafted by technocrats but was spearheaded by figures such as Professor Paulo Nogueira Neto and other experts in the field. It was therefore environmentally sound and respected by environmentalists. It was an advanced law that made environmental licensing mandatory throughout Brazil.
It was on the basis of this Act that the National Environmental Policy and the National Environmental System were established, still at that time with a top-down perspective. Over the years, democratic elements were gradually incorporated and social issues gained ground. There has, therefore, been a learning process in recent decades that has taken a significant blow with the approval of the General Environmental Licensing Act. These mechanisms set boundaries, provide for public hearings, impose guarantees of transparency in licensing processes and incorporate tools for public participation. This defeat in Congress, therefore, has implications for democracy and human rights.
Sur • The General Environmental Licensing Act is part of a set of laws dubbed the ‘Destruction Package’ – it is not, therefore, an isolated setback.22. “Novo Pacote da Destruição ameaça direitos socioambientais”, Climate Observatory, May 6, 2024, accessed November 11, 2025, https://www.oc.eco.br/novo-pacote-da-destruicao-ameaca-direitos-socioambientais. How do you assess the role of Congress in environmental policy?
SA • I entered Congress in February 1991 and stayed for three decades. My soul belongs to the Legislature. It was never easy to deal with the center and the center-right in the National Congress. Rural landowners have probably dominated the Congress since the very first session in the nineteenth century. They have always been there, and it has never been easy to pass environmental legislation, but it used to pass.
We have: the National Environmental Policy Act, from the end of the military regime; the environmental crimes laws; the Atlantic Forest Act, which is very strict in terms of forest protection; the public forest management laws; and the Forest Code, which was a major bargain with the rural landowners. We have several examples, including laws drafted together with the landowners, such as the Payment for Environmental Services Act in 2020, during the Bolsonaro administration; or the ‘brown agenda’ laws, such as the Solid Waste Act and the City Statute–a very important and controversial law that was developed over more than a decade of intense effort and coordination between social movements and the business sector. There are a number of important regulations in this area. It took time, but laws were passed.
The far right has been a new phenomenon in the last few years, emerging within the political processes that led to Bolsonaro coming into power. There were only a handful of people on the far right in Congress–that wasn’t the nature of the Legislature. I think what changed–and this is one of the reasons why I retired and moved into civil society–is that we used to have more space in Congress to debate the content of the laws, even though there were internal differences. At the negotiation tables, we would go article by article, discussing the content.
My impression was that, particularly after Arthur Lira’s term as President of the Chamber,33. Arthur Lira is a Federal Congressman for the state of Alagoas and served as President of the Chamber of Deputies from 2021 to 2025. The National Congress stopped debating and stopped doing what lies at the heart of the very concept of parliament, which is to speak, debate, and discuss. Now, it is all about imposition: “I can beat you, and this is my text.” Ready written drafts appear out of nowhere and are delivered to the rapporteurs. Instead of going through the standing committees, special committees are created and, after a single report, the text goes straight to the floor. Society has no opportunity to read what is being discussed.
I believe that shutting down this type of opportunity represents a loss in the quality of democracy. And the laws being produced are increasingly subject to judicial review. The political world is polarized, and we are doing less politics. We are engaged in power struggles, not politics, because politics requires negotiating the substance of decision-making processes and making concessions. And neither the environmental agenda nor the human rights agenda will ever have the upper hand.
Sur • How has the Judiciary responded when called upon regarding climate issues? How has the Supreme Federal Court reacted to climate litigation strategies?
SA • We do what is called networked strategic litigation. The Climate Observatory litigates systematically and always in conjunction with other organizations active in this field. Nowadays, we are monitoring around 35 legal actions. For example, we have a lawsuit aimed at suspending the preliminary license to pave the BR319. We have an ongoing lawsuit from the Bolsonaro government era demanding a climate plan consistent with IPCC numbers. And we have initiatives that support civic engagement, such as the ‘pedalada climática’ lawsuit, filed by six young climate activists–four from Engajamundo and two from Fridays for Future. We also pushed Brazil to update its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) through a citizen lawsuit filed by a group of young people.
There have been a number of successful lawsuits in the Supreme Federal Court in which the Observatory initiated the discussion, engaged with political parties, and won. The Allegation of Non-Compliance with a Fundamental Precept (ADPF) 708, regarding the Climate Fund, and the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality by Omission (ADO) 59, regarding the Amazon Fund–both on hold during the Bolsonaro administration–required the government to release funding. Together with opposition parties we achieved a result of 10 to 1 in our favor in the throes of the Bolsonaro government.
The Supreme Court has set some significant precedents in terms of socioenvironmental guarantees. The list is not a short one. Not all of them were the result of Climate Observatory lawsuits, but we are involved in this movement of direct action in the Court, particularly in what we call structural lawsuits, which aim to address omissions in public policy, as well as direct litigation in partnership with political parties.
I believe climate litigation is here to stay in Brazil and worldwide. Today, even the Office of the Solicitor General has begun to include climate damage when filing civil lawsuits seeking reparation for environmental harm. It is now possible to assess the emissions generated in a deforestation case fined by Ibama, for example, and to include this data in lawsuits. This is progress that cannot be reversed.
Sur • What parallels do you draw between your experience in Brazil during the Bolsonaro years and the weakening of climate and environmental policy in other countries similarly affected by the rise of the far right? You touched on this at the beginning of the interview and I would like to circle back to that idea.
SA • As a general rule, the far right has adopted a denialist standpoint. Not necessarily about the climate crisis itself–there are presidential advisors in the United States and academics who have written articles denying the climate crisis, which is absurd, but these days this kind of denialism has diminished and changed. Nowadays, denialists ask: “To what extent do human beings really influence all this?” They downplay the significance of the crisis and cast doubt on what scientists around the world are showing–that the world has changed and that we are living through a climate emergency.
In its most recent series of reports, the IPCC, the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,44. United Nations, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), May 20, 2023, accessed November 11, 2025, https://www.ipcc.ch/assessment-report/ar6/. presents striking information about the climate crisis. And following completion of the sixth cycle of IPCC reports, 2024 became the hottest year on record. In 2024, we surpassed the 1.5°C temperature increase in relation to pre-industrial levels–the limit proposed under the Paris Agreement. We have therefore already crossed the line we should never have crossed. The world will no longer be the same as it was. Period. And far right governments deny all of this.
For example, they all question policies based on decarbonization and the energy transition. I am not talking about a centrist government in Europe–I am talking about the far right. The Trump administration is one that could be characterized as denialist when it comes to climate policy. There are centrist governments that take important measures, but the far right is denying everything and dismantling governance frameworks of climate policy in their respective countries.
We are in a crisis of global multilateralism, but climate multilateralism, in particular, is facing serious problems. For several Climate Conferences of the Parties (COP), we have been unable to produce truly significant documents in which nations commit to cutting emissions and to funding poorer countries in terms of climate-change mitigation and adaptation. I am sure the force of the far right in various governments is contributing to this.
Sur • What is the role of the Global South in the fight for just transition, especially within the framework of the Climate COP?
SA • The Global South should forcefully demand the implementation of promises made, especially regarding funding, which are far from being fulfilled. There should be a very strong level of unity in this regard.
Brazil should also be acting more forcefully in its role as climate leader. The country has always been a significant player in international negotiations, but could do more. Among the world’s largest economies, we are the only country that could reach a carbon-negative position by 2050–not net zero, but carbon negative. The Climate Observatory believes Brazil could achieve this by 2045.
How could Brazil achieve this? About 46% of our greenhouse gas emissions are related to changes in land use–deforestation. If we controlled deforestation, we could cut emissions in Brazil by a huge percentage. The second major source of emissions is agriculture, which accounts for 28% of emissions. Is it possible to farm livestock without emitting methane? No, but emissions could be reduced through more efficient farming, rather than simply leaving animals to graze on pastureland as a way of demarcating land ownership, which is what happens in much of the country.
So, more than 70% of Brazil’s emissions are from rural areas. In most countries, the central issue is energy. Fortunately, Brazil does not depend on coal–it accounts for just 1.2% of the energy mix. We are in a privileged position, as our electricity supply is mainly sustainable.
Even with all the serious social and environmental issues associated with hydroelectric plants, it is undeniable that they help reduce emissions. The problem was the way they were implemented, displacing communities, causing deforestation and impacting Indigenous peoples. These mistakes delegitimized this source of renewable energy to the point that today it would be almost impossible to build another Belo Monte.
Currently, 13.2% of the Brazilian electricity mix comes from wind power–which is also marred with social conflicts. Brazil, a country that is so rich in wind, solar and biomass energy keeps repeating misguided models that undermine sources that could be a real asset. Few countries have an electricity mix that is more than 90% renewable, and yet we are jeopardizing this. There is still time to do things differently. Brazil should take this route, instead of expanding oil production.
Sur • In this vein, you have been outspoken against oil prospecting at the mouth of the Amazon River. In your opinion, why shouldn’t this project go ahead?
SA • In my opinion, this is the main inconsistency in the current Lula government: the plan to expand oil and gas production. It doesn’t make any sense. In theory, this government wants to be a leader on climate matters. But it cannot claim climate leadership while also seeking to be the world’s fourth largest oil producer. Brazil is already a major producer–the eighth largest in the world with 3,400,000 barrels a day, and it now aims to become the fourth, competing with Saudi Arabia at a time when the whole world should be moving away from fossil fuels.
Brazil has adopted the argument that “we are a poorer country and therefore have the right to produce oil.” This will lead to a tragic situation. And the global debate on fossil fuel is directly linked to human rights, because any decision to expand the production and use of fossil fuels in the midst of a climate crisis will lead to uncontrolled temperature increases and even more intense extreme events. We will not be able to eliminate the use of oil in the immediate future, but we need a timeline–all of us, throughout the world.
The issue is not Block 59.55. Block 59 is oil exploration field located in the Foz de Amazonas Basin, in northern Brazil. In October 2025, Ibama granted Petrobrás authorization to drill a well and carry out prospecting work there, following a licensing process that lasted over ten years. Block 59 is just a gateway they want to open to facilitate future licensing in the region. That’s all. The government is opening up a number of oil exploration frontiers in the midst of a climate crisis, and this is highly questionable.
Brazil does not need more oil to meet its domestic demand. We already export half of what we produce here. If we manage the areas that are already extracting oil in Brazil, our domestic demand will be met for many years to come. The aim is to export, but any exported oil will be burned somewhere, and will contribute to worsening the climate crisis, even if it is not included in our NDC, because exported emissions are not counted.
The International Energy Agency has already projected that global demand for oil will begin to fall in 2030–in the near future. We want to become a mega oil producer precisely at a time when the market is about to decline. Some oil reserves will have to remain underground. This is an important discussion: oil brings in money, but not social justice. The key question is: who stands to benefit from all this money? There are regions of Brazil that have been extracting oil for some time and do not have strong social indicators. For example, Maricá, a municipality in Rio de Janeiro receives billions in royalties every year and yet only about 40% of its sewage is collected–and treatment is another story.66. According to the 2022 Census by IBGE, the percentage of people living with household sewage systems connected to the public network, storm sewers or septic tanks connected to the network, in the municipality of Maricá (Rio de Janeiro) is 33.7%. According to the InfoRoyalties platform at Candido Mendes University, the municipality received R$ 2.69 billion in oil exploration royalties in 2024.
The fantasy created around oil money needs to be dismantled. Block 59 itself, which influenced voting on environmental licensing, will only generate royalties a decade from now. We do not have a decade to guarantee resources for the populations of Amapá and Pará. We have to improve living conditions now. The timelines of the oil industry do not match what the authorities are promising.
Sur • In 2025, it will be 10 years since the Paris Agreement. For a long time, we have been hearing that there is no time to lose. According to the Climate Observatory–which represents almost one hundred Brazilian organizations–what should the priorities be in the fight to implement the Agreement?
SA • The Climate Observatory believes that, although multilateral negotiations are facing issues, it will be much worse without them–and much worse if less democratic decision-making structures are adopted. There has to be a way to restore the legitimacy of multilateral negotiations. It has been stressed that no single country, not even one presiding over the conference (as is the case of Brazil at COP30), can determine the agenda alone. The agenda is international in nature. Negotiations on financing at the last COP did not go well: countries in the Global South were talking in terms of trillions, and what actually materialized was far less. It remains unclear whether anything more will be forthcoming.
The funding will have to be made up somehow, because results at the last meeting were very poor. Adaptation has always been a sub-topic while mitigation has been at the forefront of discussions. But with the worsening climate crisis, adaptation has gained ground. We need both, but adaptation–even though it features in the first two articles of the Paris Agreement–has always been treated as a secondary matter. We also needed to put something on the agenda regarding the timing for phasing out fossil fuels. As things stand today, this will be difficult, but it should be a priority for Brazilian diplomacy.
Sur • What is your assessment of market mechanisms such as carbon credits, and also how do these strategies coexist with mitigation and adaptation policies in the Global South?
SA • The carbon market is one possible tool, but it will never be the solution for all the issues. It may be important for some industrial sectors, if well-regulated–really well-regulated–, but it will never solve climate problems as a whole. In fact no single public policy or climate policy instrument can solve the crisis on its own. And there needs to be a market that looks to reducing emissions, not merely compensating for them: “I provide more safeguarding, you pollute more, let’s make a deal.” Whether internationally or domestically, it doesn’t matter.
Carbon markets need to look to reducing emissions, and the government must set caps that drive reduction. The destiny of a regulated market system should be–once emissions are under control–its abolition. But this is not how most stakeholders view the situation. I believe it is a viable tool, if applied correctly and with a focus on decarbonization. This is my personal point of view and always has been.
The voluntary market frightens me because populations and communities in these territories are being exploited and pressured. The voluntary market, in the case of Brazil, should at least have a registration system–one that makes data available so it is possible to control what is happening. There are numerous reports of problems affecting the communities, involving corporations that show up and buy or lease land, and attempt to negotiate on the voluntary market. The state has no control whatsoever. Nobody knows what is happening, and I am deeply concerned that these actors could cause harm to the Indigenous and quilombola people, to others who live in the forest, and even to small urban communities.
Sur • Still on the subject of adaptation to the climate emergency, do you believe that existing policies and mechanisms are sufficient to address race and gender specific impacts? What should the priorities be in this regard?
SA • We do not have the resources for adaptation in Brazil, neither do most other countries. We started out focusing much more on mitigation–which is extremely important, as I have said–, but we need clearer adaptation policies. In Brazil, the government is putting together a Climate Plan, which covers both mitigation and adaptation. The adaptation plan is more advanced, but in the draft of the National Adaptation Strategy it reads essentially like this: “We do not have any money for any of this.” We have even posed the question, through the Climate Observatory: “If we don’t have any money, how does the government intend to get some?” Because we are not necessarily talking about public budget funds–money from the private sector is a possibility too–but the government needs to say where the money will come from.
The government has managed to increase climate funding–a lot in fact–mostly through the Ecological Transformation plan, an initiative by the Finance Minister Fernando Haddad, and by issuing sustainable sovereign bonds. This money is raised on the market by issuing bonds, so it will have to be paid back to investors. It is costly money that must be lent by the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES). Do you think the local government of a small municipality that faces flooding or drought every year, has the means to take out a loan with BNDES, or any other public bank using Climate Fund money? It does not.
The government needs to create non-repayable funding sources. What we currently have available on these terms, for climate action, is so little that it is not even worth considering. The non-repayable portion of the Climate Fund is not even R$10 million in 2025, while the Fund totals R$20 billion. A way of securing less costly money needs to be found. This is fundamental for adaptation. Otherwise, communities that are in real need–those in high-risk areas, the poorest ones, the ones most challenged in facing this situation–will not be helped. This is why we have been advocating for the creation of an off-budget National Adaptation Fund.
Sur • What are the lessons learnt and the strategies for rebuilding environmental policies in Brazil from the perspective of civil society?
SA • I increasingly value network-based production and activities. The Climate Observatory is made up of 133 organizations, but our internal processes are always collective. A good example is the Futuro da energia (Future of Energy) report. We produced this document over the course of a year, with 23 organizations from the energy sector involved. We examined each energy source, showing what the government is doing and what we believed should be done. It was a collaborative publication from the writing stage onward. It is remarkable, but it worked, and it is a good example of the importance of network-based action.
And I think this network-based approach extends to the question of coordination. For example, Latin America, the Pan-Amazon region and countries that have tropical rainforests, face the same types of problems as Brazil. Other comparable countries include Indonesia, where deforestation is a major driver of emissions, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. And this also applies to civil society networks. We have networks specialized in combating fossil fuels and the Climate Action Network (CAN), the main international organization focused on climate negotiations. I believe that strengthening these networks and the interaction between them is the way for civil society to truly gain the power to influence.
Anyone working on climate issues constantly receives alarming information. We receive data about all kinds of disasters, about how temperatures are rising, and about how the use of fossil fuels is increasing even in the midst of a climate emergency. And that is frightening. But I believe that everyone who has this kind of information must use this reality to understand the importance of not standing still, the importance of acting to improve environmental conditions and to guarantee socioenvironmental rights and community rights –using this to fight for environmental justice and climate justice. This whole calamity has to be the basis for work and improvement. We cannot give up or accept the denialist discourse of the far right and the oil companies.
